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Oil and Gas: Burger v. Wood-A Misguided
Application of the Doctrine of Obstruction to
Third Parties
The doctrine of obstruction has generally been used by the courts,
either with respect to the habendum clause' or the drilling clause 2 of an oil
and gas lease to permit the lessee additional time to drill or to pay rentals
when acts of the lessor have warranted this extension. Thus, the lessor may
not assert that the lease has been terminated under the habendum clause for
failure on the part of the lessee to produce oil or gas during the primary term
when the lessor was found to have, in some way, obstructed the activities of
the lessee, and when this obstruction accounted for the lessee's failure to perform.' Similarly, obstruction under the drilling clause arises when the lessor
interferes with either the lessee's drilling or his payment of rentals, and such
obstruction serves to excuse the lessee for his failure to perform."
Numerous Oklahoma cases help define which acts, if committed by the
lessor, will be deemed to be obstruction. For example, physical interference,
as when the lessor threatens the lessee and his agents with physical violence,
will constitute obstruction.' Furthermore, attack on the lessee's title, such as
suit by the lessor to cancel the lease 6 or to enjoin the lessee's activities, 7 will
serve to excuse the lessee's failure to perform.' Oklahoma courts have also
held that the lessor's granting of a top lease 9 will sustain a finding of obstruc3 E. KutNrz, OIL AND GAS 1 (1967). The author defines the habendum clause as
follows: "The purpose of the habendum clause is to describe the duration of the interest granted
by the lease, subject to other provisions contained in the lease which may provide for an earlier
or later termination or forfeiture of the lease. The most common type of habendum clause in
modem use provides for a fixed term, called the primary or exploratory term, and provides that
the lease shall continue thereafter so long as oil or gas is produced."
2 Id. The author .defines the drilling clause as follows: "The drilling clause is primarily
designed to describe the rights of the lessor and lessee during the primary or exploratory term
with respect to drilling operations or the payment of rentals in lieu of drilling."
4

5 E. Ktm-z, OIL AND GAS 36 (1978); 2 E. KuNTz, OIL AND GAS 324 (1964).
5 E. KuNrz, OIL AND GAs 36 (1978); 3 E. KuNrrz, OIL AND GAS 199 (1967).

1 Durkee v. Hazan, 452 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1968); Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co., 98 Okla.
273, 225 P. 676 (1924).
1 Elsey v. Wagner, 199 Okla. 449, 183 P.2d 829 (1946); Chapman v. Bowers, 180 Okla.
49, 67 P.2d 788 (1937).
Jones v. Moore, 338 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1959).
Attacks by the lessor upon the lessee's title are generally considered to be obstruction
because it would be unreasonable to expect the lessee to make expenditures on the lease when
there is a substantial risk of loss without a prospect of gain. Too, if the attack upon his title is
successful, the lessee may be liable to the lessor for the loss of the land's speculative value should
his efforts result in a dry hole. See Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932). See
also 2 E. KuNrZ, OIL AND GAs 324 (1964).
9 Brovm, Effect of Top Leases: Obstruction of Title and Related Considerations, 30
BAYLOR L. REv. 213 (1978). A top lease is defined as "a subsequent oil and gas lease which
covers one or more mineral interests that are subject to a valid, subsisting prior lease." Id. This
would happen, for example, when the lessor, or successor of the original lessor, executes a second lease in favor of a party who is a stranger to the first lease.
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tion,"' but with the restriction that if the top lease is granted without the
knowledge of the lessee and is not recorded until after the first lease has expired, the top lease will not serve as a ground for extending the lease." Finally, adverse communications, as where the lessor asserts his belief that the

lease has expired' 2 or announces his intention to commence suit, 3 will form
the basis for a declaration of obstruction. Obstruction within the category of
adverse communications sometimes also will require the filing of a suit within
4
a reasonable time after the hostile notification.'

The purpose of this note is to examine the doctrine of obstruction along

with its underlying policies in the context of a recent Oklahoma case, Burger
v. 'Wood."3 This case in effect extended the doctrine to cover interference by

third parties in general and interference by surface owners in particular. In
reviewing the case, the court's rationale will be analyzed to determine

whether the doctrine was correctly applied. The application of the doctrine in
similar, though slightly differing situations will also be examined to
demonstrate that such a study might have been useful had it been utilized by
the court. Finally, an alternative solution will be suggested as a better method
of disposing of the case.
Burger v. Wood
In 1978 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals decided Burger v. Wood, 6 a
case both unique and disturbing. Although not binding, but only persuasive

authority,17 the decision applies the doctrine of obstruction to an entirely new
class of potential obstructors. Whereas obstruction previously had been

limited to the lessor or junior lessee of the lessor," this case establishes that
Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
Rorex v. Karcher, 101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1923). The logic behind this restriction is
that the top lease could not have been the grounds for the lessee's failure to perform if the lessee
had no knowledge of its existence until after the first lease expired.
12 Gibson & Jennings Drilling, Inc. v. Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162 P.2d 1002
(1945).
" Hudspeth v. Schmelzer, 182 Okla. 416, 77 P.2d 1123 (1938).
14 Gibson & Jennings Drilling, Inc., v. Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162 P.2d 1002
(1945).
"5 Burger v. Wood, 575 P.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
16Id.
17 44 OKLA. B.A.J. 3037 (1973). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has issued the follow-

ing policy on appellate opinions: "Opinions of the Court of Appeals which resolve novel or
unusual issues, when unsuperseded and unmodified by the Supreme Court, may be released for
publication in the official (Pacific) reporter concurrently with issuance of mandate upon request
made to the clerk of the Supreme Court by the presiding judge of the division that handed down
the opinion sought to be published. No opinion so published shall have precedential effect but
may be considered persuasive. It shall bear the notation 'Released for publication by order of the
Court of Appeals.' An opinion of the Court of Appeals that is specifically authorized by the
Supreme Court for publication in the official reporter and bears the notation 'Approved for
publication by the Supreme Court' shall be accorded precedential value."
"4 A junior lessee is the lessee who is the recipient of the lessor's top lease. He also is
referred to as the top lessee. The lessee who was first in time is referred to as the senior lessee or
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surface owners also may interfere with a lessee's performance in such a way
that additional time will be allowed for the commencement of operations. 9
The facts are brief. The lessee, Burger, held a valid oil and gas lease
whose primary term would expire on November 20, 1976, unless drilling had
been commenced. 20 Two days before the expiration date, Burger attempted
to move some equipment onto the land in order to rework a previous drilling
site but was prevented from doing so by the landowner, who had no interest
in the minerals beneath the surface. The lessee immediately filed suit to enjoin the surface owner's interference with the drilling operations, but further
interference by the surface owner necessitated a contempt action following
the injunction's award. Meanwhile, the primary term expired.
Burger subsequently filed suit and requested a declaratory judgment
that the lease was still in effect.2" The lessors, however, demurred to the petition, asserting that the lease had expired on its own terms. They based their
contention on the fact that the lessee had not begun drilling within the
primary term and that the failure was not owing to any adverse activities on
the part of the lessors. The trial court sustained the demurrer, resulting in an
appeal to the court of appeals. The parties in the appellate action apparently
argued only the issue of whether the plaintiff-lessee had sufficiently commenced drilling operations to satisfy the terms of the lease.22 The court of appeals, however, decided the case on another ground-that the lessee had
pleaded facts sufficient to excuse commencement of the drilling.
The court based its opinion on three rather broad propositions of law:
(1) an extension of the primary term turned upon the good faith of the lessee
in attempting to commence or complete drilling; (2) equity abhors a
forfeiture; and (3) an oil and gas lessee has the right of ingress and egress to
occupy the surface of the leased land to the extent necessary to drill and
develop the property. 3 Each of these decision bases will be examined in
detail, along with other factors pertinent in a decision such as this.
Good Faith of Lessee
In its opinion, the court cited numerous obstruction cases decided in
Oklahoma, noting that since previous authorities dealt with the misdoings of
lessors, none presented a set of facts similar to those presented in the instant
case. 2 4 The court then announced the postulate that these decisions extended
the primary term because of the lessor's conduct and that they "turned
upon" the good faith of the lessee. By stating this hypothesis as it did, the
the bottom lessee. See generally Brown, Effect of Top Leases: Obstruction of Title and Related
Considerations,30 BAYLOR L. REv. 213 (1978).
" See Kuntz comment, Burger v. Wood, 59 O&GR 503, 507 (1978).
20 Burger v. Wood, 575 P.2d 977, 978 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
11Id. at 979.
22

Id.

2,

Id. at 979, 980.

24

Id.
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court purposefully, and necessarily, downplayed one of the crucial criteria
for a case of obstruction. Interference on the part of the lessor is a critical
element of obstruction that simply cannot be overlooked or ignored."
The general rule with respect to the lessor's behavior is that his demeanor must be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant depriving him of the
jurisdiction of the court of equity.2 6 Courts, in order to deprive the lessor of
his ability to declare a termination of the lease, invoke the doctrine of obstruction through the use of old equitable maxims, such as, "He who invokes the
jurisdiction of equity, must come with clean hands," and "He who has done
inequity cannot have equity."" This common philosophy is augmented further in Oklahoma by Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co.,2" a decision dealing with
obstruction of the drilling clause of an oil and gas lease. In Murphy, a lessor
refused on two occasions to accept rental payments necessary to keep the
lease in effect until the lessee was able to drill.2 9 He also warned the lessee to
stay off the land but later attempted to claim that the lease had been
forfeited because of the lessee's failure to pay rentals. The court observed
that those acts the lessor claimed had not been performed were the very acts
which he purposefully had prevented. 30 After quoting and discussing several
of the various equitable adages, the court affirmed a decision for the defendant-lessee, ruling that the lessor was the culpable party and, consequently,
3
not entitled to equity. '
Thus, it can be seen that it is not solely the lessee's good faith that supplies the theoretical basis for applying the doctrine of obstruction, but it is
primarily the censurable conduct by the lessor that provides the doctrine's
foundation. In Burger the lessor had done nothing that could be considered
blameworthy.32 Since the lessor was innocent and had committed no transgressions which might rob him of the jurisdiction of a court of equity, no
theoretical platform existed upon which a court could
stand to deprive the
33
lessor of his right to declare the lease's termination.
Abhorrence of a Forfeiture
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals also argued that the obstruction cases
2'See generally Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
26 2 E. KuNTz, OIL AND GAS 323 (1964); 3 H.
ILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW 77 (1977).
27 Fey v. A.A. Oil Corp., 129 Mont. 300, 285 P.2d 578 (1955); Murphy v. Garfield Oil
Co., 98 Okla. 273, 225 P. 676 (1924).
2'98 Okla. 273, 225 P. 676 (1924).
2'Id. at 677.
" Id. at 680.
" Id. The court discussed the activities of the lessor-plaintiff and summed up its
arguments with the statement: "If they [the plaintiffs] prevail in an action of this sort, the rules
of equity count for nothing. We do not think the plaintiffs have done equity. We do not think
they are blameless, but culpable, and we do not think they are entitled to equity." Id.
32 Burger v. Wood, 575 P.2d 977, 979 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
" Kuntz comment, Burger v. Wood, 59 O&GR 503, 507 (1978). See also 5 E. KuNTZ,
OIL AND GAs 36 (1978).
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clearly point out that equity abhors a forfeiture.3 4 It is interesting to note,
however, that none of the cited cases mentioned this loathing for forfeiture,"
except for one relatively recent opinion which discusses this philosophy in
relation to a topic other than obstruction.3 6 Typically, when the primary term
lapses without the procurement of production, courts will proclaim the lease
to have terminated automatically." Although judicial distaste for forfeiture
may constitute some unspoken underlying consideration in obstruction cases,
a more accurate depiction of courts' decision-making processes would reveal
that it is upon some other, more solid ground that they ultimately rest their
opinions that the doctrine of obstruction should apply. This "other ground"
usually is a careful consideration of the acts committed by the lessor and
whether these acts were sufficient to excuse the lessee's failure to perform."
Thus, to be consistent with a long line of Oklahoma precedent," the
court of appeals should have decided its case in a manner similar to that
utilized in prior adjudications, with the emphasis upon the lessor's conduct,
not upon a distaste for forfeiture.
Right of Ingress and Egress
The third basis the court specified was that a lessee in Oklahoma has
the right of ingress and egress to occupy the surface of the leased premises to
the extent necessary to drill and develop the property.40 While this may be an
accurate portrayal of Oklahoma law, a more pressing problem lies in determining who owes this right to the lessee. Under the decisions of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, it must be maintained that it is the lessor who
owes this right in order to find him at fault for failing to assure that the
, Burger v. Wood, 575 P.2d 977, 980 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
" See generally Jones v. Moore, 338 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1959); Elsey v. Wagner, 199 Okla.
449, 183 P.2d 829 (1947); Gibson & Jennings Drilling, Inc. v. Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143,
162 P.2d 1002 (1945); Hudspeth v. Schmelzer, 182 Okla. 416, 77 P.2d 1123 (1938); Chapman v.
Bowers, 18) Okla. 49, 67 P.2d 788 (1937); Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419
(1932).
36 Durkee v. Hazan, 452 P.2d 803, 814 (Okla. 1969). Here, the court discussed forfeiture
in relation to the lessee's supposed failure to operate and develop the lease. On this topic, the
court stated that a forfeiture will be decreed only when necessary to effectuate justice.
" E.g., Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848, 189 P. 920 (1920); Browning v.
Cavanaugh, 300 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1957); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
" See generally Durkee v. Hazan, 452 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1969); Jones v. Moore, 338 P.2d
872 (Okla. 1959); Elsey v. Wagner, 199 Okla. 449, 183 P.2d 829 (1947); Gibson & Jennings Drilling, Inc. v. Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162 P.2d 1002 (1945); Hudspeth v. Schmelzer,
182 Okla. 416, 77 P.2d 1123 (1938); Chapman v. Bowers, 180 Okla. 49, 67 P.2d 788 (1937);
Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
" Durkee v. Hazan, 452 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1969); Jones v. Moore, 338 P.2d 872 (Okla.
1959); Elsey v. Wagner, 199 Okla. 449, 183 P.2d 829 (1947); Gibson & Jennings Drilling, Inc. v.
Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162 P.2d 1002 (1945); Hudspeth v. Schmelzer, 182 Okla. 416,
77 P.2d 1123 (1938); Chapman v. Bowers, 180 Okla. 49, 67 P.2d 788 (1937); Simons v.
McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
4' Burger v. Wood, 575 P.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
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lessee was permitted access to the land." It is only under this construction

that grounds would exist for denying the lessor the jurisdiction of a court of
equity.
In Burger, when the land in question was initially severed from the
minerals beneath it, 42 the owner of the mineral estate did not in fact obtain
title to the unproduced oil and gas but, instead, secured only the right to cap-

ture the subterranean substances.4 3 The mineral owner did, however, concurrently procure the incidental rights necessary to the beneficial use of his in-

terest, including the right of ingress and egress and the privilege of using so
much of the surface as required in order to extract the minerals.4" When the
owner of the mineral rights executed a lease in favor of the lessee to allow
him to develop the oil and gas, he granted the lessee the same right of ingress

and egress that previously had been bestowed upon lessor.4 5 A synopsis of the
situation, then, would show the surface owner to be the owner of the entire
surface estate and the lessee to have a profit a prendre encumbering that
estate.4" This profit a prendre is very similar to an easement and often is
treated as being in the same category as easements because the same legal
principles apply to both.47 Hence, the owner of a profit a prendre has the
right to use so much of the surface as is necessary to develop his interest, and
to refrain from interfering with the
the surface owner has an obligation
4
reasonable operations of the lessee. 1
See Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co., 98 Okla. 273, 225 P. 676 (1924).
42 575 P.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978). The landowner in the case owned only the surface and had no interest in the minerals. Therefore, sometime previously the surface and mineral
estate must have been legally severed from one another.
' See Cuff v. Koslosky, 165 Okla. 135, 137, 25 P.2d 290, 291-92 (1933). Here, the court
quoted from a previous Oklahoma opinion, saying: "Oil and gas in the earth are, unlike ore and
coal, fugacious and incapable of ownership distinct from the land, and a grant of the oil and gas
in a tract of land is a grant of that part of the oil and gas therein which the grantee may find and
capture, no title vests until the oil or gas is reduced to possession by extracting the same from the
earth, and hence the lease is a grant of an incorporeal-hereditament." This incorporeal hereditament, the court stated, is "more specifically, as designated in the ancient French, a profit a prendre, analogous to a profit to hunt and fish on the land of another." Id.
" See Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940); Romey v. Stephens, 70
Okla. 87, 173 P. 72 (1918). These cases establish that this right passes to the owner of the
mineral rights regardless of whether it is specifically delineated in the deed.
41 See Rich v. Doneghy, 71 Okla. 204, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918).
" Cuff v. Koslosky, 165 Okla. 135, 25 P.2d 290 (1933). See also I E. KuNTZ, OIL AND
GAS § 3.2 at 80 (1962).
.1J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 335 (2d ed. 1975). See also 1 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAs § 210.2 at 119, § 210.4 at 126 (1970). Here, the.authors
indicate that the surface rights which accompany the mineral rights, whether considered to be
corporeal or incorporeal, are easements.
" See, e.g., Cozart v. Crenshaw, 299 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); United North &
South Oil Co. v. Mercer, 286 S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Mid-Texas Pet. Co. v. Colcord,
235 S.W. 710 (rex. Civ. App. 1921). See generally 12 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 683 (repl. 1980); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 335 (2d ed. 1975).
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Thus, it can be seen that it was the surface owner who owed the lessee
the undisturbed right to enter and use the land. The mineral owner-lessor,
having bestowed upon the lessee the rights and duties accompanying their
contractual arrangement, steps out of the picture and, in the normal situation, is not privy to any land use disputes that may arise between the lessee
and the surface owner. Not a party to the controversy, the lessor can hardly
be said to be anything other than an innocent third person. Therefore, he
would have every right to the remedies available in a court of equity and
every right to claim termination of a lease when the other party, for whatever
reason, has not complied with its terms.
Third Party Obstruction
A useful -tool the court could have employed in reaching its decision in
the instant case would have been to study the manner in which courts traditionally have dealt with third party obstruction with respect to the drilling
clause in an oil and gas lease. 4 9 Although Burger v. Wood"0 deals with
obstruction of the lease's habendum clause, the two forms of obstruction are
analogous, and a study of one often will provide insights into the other.52
Generally, interference by third persons, either with the operations
themselves or by attacks upon the title, does not constitute obstruction. 2
However, if the interference serves to breach the lessor's warranty, or if the
lessee has reason to believe the lessor is actively cooperating with the third
person, or if the interference is comprised of a judicial action, the lessee's
5 3
nonperformance will be excused.
In accord with the general rule, the Louisiana Supreme Court declined
to find obstruction in a case in which the federal government claimed land
leased by the state to the plaintiffs.5 4 The lessees sought a suspension of the
obligation to pay rentals during the pendency of the suit, but their request
was denied. The court noted that the leases were free from ambiguity and
that the lessees should have included a provision in the lease had they wanted
to suspend payments under such circumstances." Subsequently, a federal

" See, e.g., Broussard v. Phillips Pet. Co., 160 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La. 1958); Texas
Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 216 La. 742, 44 So. 2d 841 (1949); Schell v. Black, 321 S.W.2d 373
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
" 575 P.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978). The facts of the case reveal that the primary term
completely expired. Since the drilling clause deals with drilling or the payment of rentals in lieu
thereof in order to preserve the right to drill during the primary term, the complete expiration of
the primary term would involve an obstruction of the habendum clause rather than of the drilling clause. See notes 1 and 2, supra.
11See generally 5 E. KuTrz, OIL AND GAs §§ 56.1-56.5 (1978). Here, the author combines the two forms of obstruction and discusses them together.
" See Murphy v. Garfield Oil Co., 98 Okla. 273, 225 P. 676 (1924).
" Slack v. Riggs, 177 La. 222, 148 So. 32 (1933); Allen v. Palmer, 201 Okla. 673, 209
P.2d 502 (1948); Munsey v. Mornet Oil & Gas Co., 199 S.W. 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
, Texas Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 216 La. 742, 44 So. 2d 841 (1949).
IId., 44 So. 2d at 845.
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court sitting in Louisiana reached a similar conclusion in an analogous case."
There, the defendants had failed to pay rentals when they were due but insisted that their failure to drill within the allotted time was due to the State
Conservation Department's refusal to issue a permit. ' The opinion, quite
unsympathetically, announced that there was no reason whatsoever that the
defendants could not have paid the delay rentals during the pendency of the
application before the Commissioner of Conservation.- 8 A Texas court, in
another case involving third party obstruction of the drilling clause, also proclaimed that in the absence of equitable considerations, the omission of
either drilling or paying rentals would result in the lease's termination.59
On their faces, these cases may appear to lack the substance necessary
to aid one in determining the proper outcome of a case of the same genre as
Burger v. Wood. 0 It is readily perceivable, for example, that a court may
display far less compassion toward a party attempting to escape the seemingly light burden of paying rentals than it would toward a party who apparently did everything within his power to drill within the permissible time
but was physically prevented from doing so. The cases, likewise, decline to
discuss the fact that the lessor was innocent of any wrongdoing. These decisions, however, do manage to demonstrate decidedly courts' tendencies to
deny extension of the lease unless the lessor has shown some fault or im6
propriety. Such is not the case in Burger v. Wood. '
The Burger court based its decision upon an erroneous interpretation of
the doctrine of obstruction. Evidently, the court thought the doctrine could
be applied whenever anyone prevented the lessee from obtaining production
within the primary term of the lease. 62 However, in order to warrant employment of the doctrine of obstruction, it is the lessor or his junior lessee who
must interfere with the operations. Therefore, the doctrine was actually inapplicable in Burger.
Other Available Remedies
If the court of appeals had refused to extend the primary term of the
lease involved in Burger v. Wood,3 other remedial options would have remained open to the plaintiffs. Although the suit against the lessor provided
the only means by which the lessee could ensure that the lease would remain
intact, the lessee could just as easily, and a bit more logically, have brought
Broussard v. Phillips Pet. Co., 160 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La. 1958).
, Id. at 909.
IId.
Schell v. Black, 321 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
60 575 P.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
"Id.
62 Id. at 979. The court questioned only whether the surface owner had acted so as to
warrant extension of the pffmary term. The opinion did not even attempt to justify application
of the doctrine to someone other than the lessor, indicating that the judges perhaps were
unaware of this restriction upon the doctrine.
11575 P.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
56
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suit against the landowner to recover money damages for his injury. For instance, a surface owner's unauthorized interference with a profit a prendre,
because it so closely resembles an easement, would apparently give rise to a
cause of action for a wrongful invasion of this right and could be maintained
by the owner of the easement against the surface owner." Courts also have
held that the relief awarded for such an interference need not automatically
be injunctive but may consist of money damages. 6 1 Thus, depending upon
the circumstances, the monetary compensation can serve to recompense the
plaintiff for any consequential damages he suffered because of the defendant's interference," or it can serve to reimburse him for the permanent
deprivation of his right because of the impracticability or impossibility of
7
restoring it to him.6
Another theory of recovery that could be asserted in an action against
the landowner is that of interference with contractual relations. 6 Here,
damages would be assessed in accordance with those injuries that naturally
flowed from the interference, including such loss of profits as the plaintiffs
could show to have proximately resulted from the wrongful acts. 6 Although
wholly speculative damages will not be awarded,7 the tortious rather than
64 See generally Durkee v. Hazan, 452 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1969); Jones v. Moore, 338 P.2d
872 (Okla. 19:59); Elsey v. Wagner, 199 Okla. 449, 183 P.2d 829 (1947); Gibson & Jennings Drilling, Inc. v. Amos Drilling Co., 196 Okla. 143, 162 P.2d 1002 (1945); Hudspeth v. Schmelzer,
182 Okla. 416, 77 P.2d 1123 (1938); Chapman v. Bowers, 180 Okla. 49, 67 P.2d 788 (1937);
Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
11Chapin v. Popilowski, 139 Conn. 84, 90 A.2d 167 (1952); Sargent v. Brunner Housing
Corp., 31 A.D.2d 823, 297 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1969); Yager Pontiac, Inc. v. Fred A. Danker & Sons,
Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 546, 330 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (holds-that an award of damages can be
made, but only when warranted by special circumstances and only in lieu of a permanent injunction); Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 124 W. Va. 118, 19 S.E.2d 217 (1942).
66 Chapin v. Popilowski, 139 Conn. 84, 90 A.2d 167 (1952); Moundsville Water Co. v.
Moundsville Sand Co., 124 W. Va. 118, 19 S.E.2d 217 (1942).
61Sargent v. Brunner Housing Corp., 31 A.D.2d 823, 297 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1969); Yager
Pontiac, Inc. v. Fred A. Danker & Sons, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 546, 330 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
68See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 934-49 (4th ed. 1971); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR.,
TORTS 497-510 (1956). A problem exists with this theory of recovery since the landowner probably did not act with the specific intent of causing the plaintiff to breach his contract but only to
prevent the plaintiff from coming onto his land, knowing that this would probably make the
plaintiff incapable of meeting his contractual obligations. The courts are split on how to deal
with this dilemma. The authors cited above suggest that the question be resolved on the issue of
privilege, that is, whether the defendant's conduct could be excused in some way under the concept that it was privileged. This would require that the interest the defendant was attempting to.
protect be "superior," or of a greater social importance, than the plaintiff's interests. The
Burger decision fails to specify why the surface owner behaved as he did, but the court issuing
the injunction against the landowner apparently felt that his interests were of a lesser social importance than those of the lessee. Thus, interference with contractual relations would probably
be a sound theory to pursue.
69 Salomon v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 93, 101 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Allison v.
American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
"' Mid-Continental Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1200 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Mays v.Stratton, 183 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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NOTES

the contractual nature of the action decrees that the determination of the
damages not be subject to a precise mathematical computation." In addition,
Oklahoma, along with other jurisdictions, permits the recovery of punitive

damages in suitable cases. 7"
The principal problem in a case such as this lies in the determination of
damages. The real injury incurred by the plaintiff is the loss of the lease and,

consequently, the potential profits that could have been secured through the
development of the oil and gas interests. Thus, a calculation of the plaintiff's

lost profits would necessarily entail an estimation of the quantities of oil
and/or gas which a well, if drilled, would have produced throughout its

lifetime. This could be a formidable task. At first glance, such a damages
evaluation might appear to be completely speculative, yet a series of cases

dealing with damages awardable for a breach of an express drilling covenant
shows that this kind of measuring device is not unreasonable. 7 These opi-

nions stress that simply because the damages are difficult to determine or are
impossible to ascertain with mathematical certainty, the courts should not be

dissuaded from applying this yardstick. 74 This is not to say, however, that a
court always should permit this kind of estimate to be made because there are

situations, such as when the well to be drilled was exploratory and had no
nearby comparable production, where the evidence will be insufficient to lay

a nonconjectural basis for a finding of damages. 7s It also has been held that
evidence of potential oil production from secondary recovery operations of
the undrilled well, as opposed to proof of primary production, is too
speculative to take into consideration. 6 Overall, however, these authorities
demonstrate that the damages incurred by a failure or an inability to drill a
well may be assessed by a method that embodies an analysis of that undrilled
11Salomon v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 93, 101 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
11Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
73 Julian Pet. Corp. v. Courtney Pet. Co., 22 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1927); Higgins v. Grant,
111 Cal. App. 351, 295 P. 532 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Fallis v. Julian Pet. Corp., 108 Cal. App.
559, 292 P. 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Midland Gas Corp. v. Reffitt, 286 Ky. 11, 149 S.W.2d
537 (1941); Fain-McGaha Oil Corp. v. Owens, 132 Tex. 109, 121 S.W.2d 982 (1938); Hardwick
v. Jackson, 315 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Westgate-Greenland Oil Co. v. Mack, 164
S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Guardian Trust Co. v. Brothers, 59 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933).
' Waldrip v. Hamon, 136 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1955); Midland Gas Corp. v. Reffitt, 286 Ky. I1, 149 S.W.2d 537, 540 (1941); Fain-McGaha Oil Corp. v. Owens, 132 Tex. 109,
121 S.W.2d 982 (1938); jdi
Trust Co. v. Brothers, 59 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933).
" Waldrip v. Hamon, 136 F. Supp. 412, 413 (E.D. Okla. 1955); Denman v. Aspen Drilling Co., 214 Kan. 402, 520 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974).
71 Wadrip v. Hamon, 136 F. Supp. 412, 413 (E.D. Okla. 1955). Primary production is
considered to be that oil or gas that the well, either with or without the aid of a pumping unit, is
able to produce strictly because of the enormous underground reservoir pressures. Secondary
recovery refers to a more artificial means of producing the oil, usually consisting of a waterflood
operation where water is forced down some of the wells and into the reservoir in order to push
the oil up the remaining wells. For a general discussion on the history and technical aspects of
waterflooding, see Mallory v. McDermott, 274 A.D. 254, 80 N.Y.S.2d 486 (App. Div. 1948).
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